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The appropriate response of Spanish Gitanos: Short-
run orientation beyond current socio-economic status 
Abstract 
Humans differ greatly in their tendency to discount future events, but the reasons 
underlying such inter-individual differences remain poorly understood. The evolutionary 
framework of Life History Theory predicts that the extent to which individuals discount 
the future should be influenced by socio-ecological factors such as mortality risk, 
environmental predictability and resource scarcity. However, little empirical work has 
been conducted to compare the discounting behavior of human groups facing different 
socio-ecological conditions. In a lab-in-the-field economic experiment, we compared the 
delay discounting of a sample of Romani people from Southern Spain (Gitanos) with that 
of their non-Romani neighbors (i.e., the majority Spanish population). The Romani-
Gitano population constitutes the main ethnic minority in all of Europe today and is 
characterized by lower socio-economic status (SES), lower life expectancy and poorer 
health than the majority, along with a historical experience of discrimination and 
persecution. According to Life History Theory, Gitanos will tend to adopt “faster” life 
history strategies (e.g., earlier marriage and reproduction) as an adaptation to such 
ecological conditions and, therefore, should discount the future more heavily than the 
majority. Our results support this prediction, even after controlling for the individuals’ 
current SES (income and education). Moreover, group-level differences explain a large 
share of the individual-level differences. Our data suggest that human inter-group 
discrimination might shape group members’ time preferences through its impact on the 
environmental harshness and unpredictability conditions they face. 
Keywords: Romani, delay discounting, impatience, adaptation, evolutionary 
psychology, life history   
1. Introduction. 
In nature, individuals of different species often have to choose between outcomes realized 
at different times (Ainslie, 1975; Rachlin & Green, 1972). These inter-temporal choices 
are also ubiquitous in the lives of humans, for instance, in the spheres of marriage and 
reproduction, education and work, as well as during social and market interactions (Espín 
et al., 2012, 2015; Frederick et al., 2002; Nettle et al., 2011; Woodburn, 1980). When 
faced with such decisions, individuals tend to discount the value of delayed rewards 
(benefits or costs). The preference for sooner-smaller rewards over later-larger rewards 
has been referred to as delay discounting (DD) (Frederick et al., 2002; Kirby et al. 2002). 
DD is considered to be a measure of one of the multiple domains of impulsivity, namely 
“impulsive choice” (Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2006). 
DD is a relatively stable individual characteristic (Ohmura et al., 2006; Kirby, 2009) and 
people differ greatly in the extent to which they discount the future (Frederick et al., 
2002). However, the factors underlying such inter-individual differences remain poorly 
understood. On the one hand, there is evidence suggesting that DD rates may be 
genetically determined to some extent (Anokhin et al., 2011, 2015; Aycinena & 
Rentschler, 2017; Bevilacqua & Goldman, 2013). On the other hand, people’s current 
socio-economic conditions, as proxied by variables such as education and income, also 
seem to be related to DD: poorer and less educated individuals have been found to 
discount the future more heavily (Harrison et al., 2002; Kirby et al. 2002; Tanaka et al., 
2010), although the causal direction is unclear (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). In addition, a 
number of behavioral disorders (e.g., attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, aggression, 
suicide, and substance abuse) have been associated with high DD (Barkley et al., 2001; 
Bickel, & Marsch, 2001; Dombrovski et al., 2011).  
The latter evidence has been taken to support the notion of high DD as a maladaptive 
trait. However, under certain socio-ecological conditions, discounting the future can be a 
contextually appropriate response. To be more specific, developing a preference for the 
short-run may be fitness-maximizing in harsh and unpredictable environments (Becker & 
Mulligan, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Hill et al., 2008; Pepper, 
& Nettle, 2017).  
According to Life History Theory (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Roff, 1993), variation in 
life history traits (e.g., size and number of offspring, parental investment, longevity, time 
to first reproduction, sociability) can be understood in terms of trade-offs in the allocation 
of resources to competing life functions such as maintenance, growth, and reproduction. 
The accumulated set of resource allocation decisions during life constitutes the 
individual’s life history strategy, which leads to the development of an integrated 
collection of life history traits. The most common approach to life history strategies poses 
a continuum from slow to fast (Promislow & Harvey, 1990). Life History Theory relies 
on this slow-to-fast approach to predict variation of traits and strategies both between and 
within species. In this vein, unpredictable and harsh environments are particularly related 
to the development of fast life history strategies that divert resources from long-term 
outcomes in favor of short-term outcomes, while predictable and secure settings lead to 
strategies in the opposite, slow end of the continuum (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). 
Life history strategies are often seen as species-distinctive characteristics but humans (as 
well as other organisms) have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that allow 
them to adjust life history strategies to match local conditions during lifetime (Belsky et 
al., 1991; Brumbach et al., 2009; Ellis, 2004; McCullough et al., 2013; Nettle et al., 2010, 
2011; Worthman, 2003). These strategies would lead to the maximization of individuals’ 
average lifetime inclusive fitness (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005; Roff, 1993).  
Yet, although the theoretical literature on life history clearly stresses the role of 
environmental conditions in shaping individuals’ DD, more research needs to be 
conducted to assess this link empirically. While a number of individual-level studies 
provide support for the hypothesized relationships (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Chipman 
& Morrison, 2015; Green et al., 1996; Griskevicius et al., 2011; Kirby et al. 2002; Pender, 
1996), few experiments to date have studied to what extent the conditions of harshness 
and future-unpredictability faced by different groups can predict individual differences in 
DD. Ramos et al. (2013) is, to the best of our knowledge, the only experimental study 
directly approaching the question. Consistently with the theoretical predictions, the 
authors show that slum-dwelling youth in Brazil (highly exposed to violence) discount 
future hypothetical rewards more heavily than university students. In this paper we further 
contribute to fill this empirical gap. 
To test the predictions of the evolutionary framework of Life History Theory, this study 
explores the differences in DD between two populations which often face different socio-
ecological pressures even if they live in the same geographic areas, even in the same 
villages and neighborhoods. In particular, using experimental economics methods, we 
compare the discounting behavior of a sample of Romani people from Southern Spain 
(Gitanos, or Calé, as they typically refer to themselves) with that of their non-Romani 
neighbors (i.e., the majority Spanish population). Technically speaking, we set up a 
controlled experimental design where ethnicity is the only variable that changes between 
treatment and control groups.  
The localities where we conducted our experiments are characterized by a particularly 
high concentration of Gitano people, amounting to over 25% of the total population, 
compared to 1-1.5% in the whole of Spain (Gamella, 1996; Gamella et al., 2014). 
However, the Gitano population is clearly differentiated in their demographic and cultural 
profile, and faces a markedly different socio-economic “ecology” than the majority. 
Hence it constitutes a paradigmatic ethnic group for the goal of this study. 
Notwithstanding this, it is worth noting that identical opportunities (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 
1992) in terms of access to public education, social benefits and healthcare, are provided 
to the Gitano population, at least since the advent of democracy in Spain, four decades 
ago.  
Compared to the dominant majority, the Gitano population of Spain is characterized by a 
lower socio-economic status (SES), including lower income and education, and also by 
poorer health, lower life expectancy and higher fertility rates (Casals et al., 2011; Cook 
et al., 2013; Gamella, 2011; Gamella et al., 2014; La Parra Casado et al., 2016; MSC-
FSG, 2005). These processes have generated a differentiated demographic profile. For 
instance, in the study area, the Gitano population had a mean age of 27 years compared 
to the near 42 of the overall local population (Gamella, 2011). Life expectancy at birth 
has increased in this population almost continuously since the mid 1940s. But still today 
it seems to be from 5 to 10 years below that of their non-Gitano neighbors (Gamella, 
2011; MSC-FSG, 2005). This resulted in a different set of aggregated needs and outlooks. 
However, despite a long-lasting coexistence in many local areas, social exclusion, forced 
assimilation and discrimination by the majority have considerably influenced the lives of 
Gitanos as well as of other Romani groups in almost every part of the world (Matras, 
2015). In Spain this still affects the lives of Gitano people, particularly in the most 
segregated areas. 
Several distinctive features of Gitano social life seem to reflect adaptations to these 
negative environmental and historical conditions. For instance, Gitanos maintain a strong 
and oppositional sense of identity and high levels of ethnic and familial endogamy. In the 
study area the Gitano minority presented rates of inbreeding five to eight times larger 
than those of the general population, and have maintained these until the present (Gamella 
& Martín, 2007; Martín & Gamella, 2005; Núñez Negrillo, 2016). These endogamous 
strategies tend to increase their social and perhaps their genetic homogeneity (Bittles, 
2012). However they also might work as a protection against external threats associated 
with the discriminatory environments that Gitano confronted as a group (Fraser, 1995; 
Gamella et al., 2013; Matras, 2015). Interestingly, the rate of incarceration of Gitanos is 
still nowadays much higher than that of the majority population. As an example, in a 
number of recent studies, Gitano women accounted for over 25% of the female prison 
population, a huge over-representation (Cerezo, 2016; Feintuch, 2013). 
In addition, most Gitano groups, as other Romani groups through Europe, also maintain 
patterns of early and pronatalist marriage. Gitano women in the study area were found to 
have a mean age of first childbirth of 18-19 years (over a decade earlier than the Spanish 
average), and total fertility rates that doubled and even tripled those of the Spanish 
population at large (Gamella, 2011; Martín & Gamella, 2005). Infant mortality rates 
displayed by Gitanos have declined sharply during the last 60 years but are still nowadays 
considerably larger (about 40%) than those observed in the non-Gitano population 
(Gamella & Martín, 2017; Martín & Gamella, 2005; MSC-FSG, 2005).  
These patterns of Gitanos can be understood as life history strategies lying at the 
(relatively) fast end of the fast-slow continuum, which are typically adopted by people 
who grow up in unpredictable and harsh environments (Brumbach et al., 2009; Dickins 
et al., 2012; Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Johns et al., 2011). When the future is uncertain or 
predictably harsh, therefore, the appropriate response might be to develop a short time 
horizon (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Pepper & Nettle, 2017) and to 
adopt strategies such as giving birth, as soon as possible, to the maximum number of 
offspring (Dickins et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2011; Nettle et al., 2011; Worthman, 2003). 
In these ecologies, long-term planning may not pay off because there is uncertainty that 
the organism will live until late adulthood. Although environmental harshness (risk of 
mortality-morbidity) and unpredictability (stochastic variation in salient environmental 
conditions) are theoretically and empirically dissociable and may have differential effects 
on several life history traits (Belsky et al., 2012; Brumbach et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2009;), 
an orientation to the short-run is by definition predicted by both factors (Ellis et al., 2009; 
Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Roff, 1993). In addition, the evidence suggests that the effects 
of environmental harshness and unpredictability on life history strategies are additive, not 
interactive (Brumbach et al., 2009). We extent on these points in the Discussion section. 
In this vein, Life History Theory predicts that Gitanos will tend to display higher DD 
rates than their non-Romani neighbors, due to the differential ecologies faced. What is 
more, it is expected that individual socio-economic factors such as education and income 
may account for some but not all of the difference. Group differences, given the shared 
environmental influences within each group, should indeed explain a large share of the 
individual differences. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Protocol and participants 
Five lab-in-the-field experimental sessions were conducted in five similar semi-rural 
towns in Southern Spain (see Espín et al. 2012 for more details). From a total of 160 
participants, nine were excluded from the analyses due to missing information in some of 
the key variables of this study. The final sample thus consists of 151 participants (63.6% 
females). Among these, 64 are (self-)identified as Gitanos, whereas 87 belong to the 
majority, non-Romani population. Average age in our sample was 46.8 (range 17-82) 
years old. All the socio-demographic data were gathered in a post-experimental face-to-
face interview. 
 
2.2. Delay discounting task and measures  
To measure the participants’ DD, we employed a multiple-price-list task (Harrison et al., 
2002) with a one-month front-end delay (Espín et al., 2012). Using a decision sheet (see 
Figure S1 in the Supplementary Materials), the task consisted of 20 decisions in which 
the participant had to choose between receiving €150 in one month time and receiving a 
higher amount (increasing from €151.50 to €225 across decisions – i.e., from 2% to 100% 
simple interest rate) in seven months time by marking the preferred option with a cross. 
All participants were presented with same decisions in the same (ascending) order. The 
fact that both the sooner-smaller and the later-larger reward were delayed, so that there 
was no “today” option, allows capturing long-term discounting behavior and alleviates 
the effect of distrust (about the experimenters actually coming back to the town to pay 
participants) on decisions. However, as detailed in the Discussion section, the use of this 
type of task entails some limitations that might influence our results. 
In every session, one participant was randomly chosen to receive the real payment (on 
the specific date) associated with the participant’s choice in one randomly-selected 
decision. We refer to the Supplementary Materials (Text S1) for a more detailed 
explanation of the experimental procedure. 
 
2.3. Delay discounting measures.  
In the literature on DD there is considerable debate over which particular functional form 
better characterizes individuals’ discounting (Andersen et al., 2014; Frederick et al., 
2002). The most common measures of DD are based on either exponential (constant-
discounting) or hyperbolic (decreasing-discounting) functional forms. For robustness, we 
test our hypothesis using both characterizations. In particular, we obtained a discounting 
parameter K for each individual using the following equations:    
• For the hyperbolic functional form (henceforth Hyper-K) 
𝑉𝑑 =
𝑉𝑢
(1 + 𝐾𝑑)
 
• For the exponential functional form (henceforth Exp-K) 
𝑉𝑑  =  𝑉𝑢𝑒
−𝐾𝑑 
Where Vd stands for the reward’s discounted subjective value, Vu refers to its undiscounted 
value and d is the delay until its receipt (in years). The K parameter is derived from 
equalizing the discounted value of the sooner-smaller reward to that of the later-larger 
reward at the individual’s indifference point between both rewards (see next subsection 
for an explanation of the different indifference points considered in the different 
analyses). The higher the K, the more heavily future rewards are discounted and thus the 
more short-run oriented the individual is.  
The stability and external validity of DD measures have been evaluated in a number of 
previous studies. The test-retest stability of discount rates has been found to be in the 
range that is typically obtained for personality traits (Anokhin et al., 2015; Kirby, 2009; 
Ohmura et al., 2006). While some null results exist, evidence abounds that supports the 
validity of DD measures to predict behaviors with future consequences, such as 
addictions and drug consumption (Baker et al., 2003; Kirby, 2009; Yi et al., 2010), 
physical activity and obesity/overweight (Chabris et al., 2008; Reimers et al., 2009; 
Weller et al., 2008), and savings and loan use (Meier & Sprenger, 2010, 2012; Sutter et 
al., 2013). 
 
2.4. Statistical analysis 
We first report descriptive statistics for all the variables analyzed, separately for the 
Gitano and majority samples, in Table 1. Zero-order correlations between all the variables 
are presented in Table 2. Although for some secondary analyses other approaches such 
as Fisher’s exact or Mann-Whitney tests could be more appropriate, we report p-values 
from Table 2 for the sake of brevity (the qualitative nature of these secondary results does 
not change using alternative approaches, however; see Text S2 in the Supplementary 
Materials). In Figure 1, we visually compare the DD of Gitanos with that of the majority 
employing different approaches. For all these analyses, we consider that the smallest 
amount at which an individual is willing to wait the six–month delay represents her 
indifference point between the sooner-smaller and the later-larger reward (as in Espín et 
al., 2012).  
For the second analysis, we estimated individuals’ K parameters using interval regressions 
(Harrison et al., 2002). In this set of regressions, the indifference point of an individual is 
estimated to be in the interval between the later-larger amount offered in the decision 
immediately before the individual switched from the sooner-smaller to the later-larger 
reward and that offered in the switching decision (for those individuals who never 
switched, the interval is assumed to be open; note that participants were specifically 
instructed not to follow multiple-switching, inconsistent patterns, as explained in more 
detail in Text S1). The regression analysis also allows us to control for key individual 
variables which could mediate a potential difference in DD between Gitanos and the 
majority. 
All the analyses were conducted using Stata v12 (StataCorp, Texas, USA). Unless 
otherwise stated, reported p-values were calculated from two-tailed tests.  
 
3. Results 
Regarding demographic differences between the Gitano and majority samples, the former 
were younger and more likely to be males (see Table 1; both ps<0.03 according to 
Spearman correlation, Table 2). For current SES, we observe that Gitanos were less likely 
to have a regular monthly income source, and reported a lower monthly income (both 
own income and other household’s income) and a lower number of years of schooling, 
compared to the majority (all ps<0.01, see Tables 1 and 2). These differences are an 
indication of the representativeness of our Gitano and majority samples. 
In panel A of Figure 1, a stochastic dominance approach is used to compare the responses 
of the two ethnic groups in the DD task. In panels B and C, respectively, we display the 
mean Hyper-K and Exp-K of the two groups for each age tercile. Finally, in panels D and 
E, we perform the same comparison but now the sample is split into below-median and 
above-median total household income (given by the combination of own income and 
other household’s income). 
We observe that, on average, Gitanos discount the future more heavily than the majority 
(mean differences of 0.272 and 0.181 for Hyper-K and Exp-K, respectively; see Table 1). 
For both characterizations of K, the raw (without controls) difference between Gitanos 
and the majority is significant according to Spearman correlation (p<0.01, Table 2) and 
interval regression (ps<0.01, Table 3, model 1). Similarly, as shown in panel A of Figure 
1, the DD of the majority is stochastically dominated by that of Gitanos. More 
specifically, strict dominance is observed for all values (number of sooner-smaller 
choices) higher than two. From Figure 1A we can also see that our DD measure is strongly 
right-censored, especially for Gitanos (48% and 21% of the Gitano and majority 
individuals, respectively, chose the sooner-smaller option in every decision), which 
implies that reported differences will tend to underestimate the true underlying effect. 
However, as mentioned, Gitanos differ from the majority according to all the variables 
which will serve as individual-level controls. More importantly, some of these variables 
are also correlated with DD, in particular those used as proxies for current SES: income 
(both one’s own and household’s income) and years of schooling are negatively related 
with DD, although in some cases the correlation is only marginally significant (ps<0.07, 
Table 2). Therefore, the aforementioned ethnic differences in DD might actually be driven 
by individual socio-economic factors. 
After controlling for these potential individual-level confounds, however, Gitanos still 
display higher discount rates than the majority according to both DD characterizations 
(ps<0.03, models 2-4 in Table 3; see also panels B-E in Figure 1). Comparing model 1 
with models 2-4 in Table 3, we observe that the addition of control variables does not 
substantially reduce the coefficient of ethnicity. Furthermore, among the control 
variables, only the highest category of own income (€2000-€3000) remains significant or 
marginally significant when ethnicity is taken into account (ps<0.06); both education and 
household’s income become non-significant (ps>0.40). Thus, it is the group-level 
differences that appear to explain a large portion of the individual-level differences, not 
the opposite. 
Finally, another prediction of an adaptationist approach to DD is that age will show a U-
shaped relationship with K: both young and old individuals must discount the future more 
heavily than middle-aged individuals (Becker & Mulligan, 1997; Read & Read, 2004) 
because external hazards are perceived to be higher at younger ages (i.e., young people 
do not yet know if their world is risky or safe) whereas the true risk of death increases 
with age (Sozou & Seymour, 2003). We indeed observe a slight U-shaped relationship 
between age and K, in particular among Gitanos (see panels B and C in Figure 1), with a 
minimum K at about 44 yr. according to the regression estimates (see models 2-4 in Table 
3), similarly to (Read & Read, 2004). Yet, the coefficients of age and age squared would 
only approach significance using one-tailed hypothesis testing (ps<0.20 and ps<0.10 for 
two- and one-tailed tests, respectively). 
 
4. Discussion 
These results contribute to the scarce empirical literature on group-level differences in 
discounting behavior. Our data supports the adaptationist arguments of Life History 
Theory. That is, participants from the ethnic group which faces harsher and more 
unpredictable ecological conditions discount the future more heavily even after 
controlling for the individuals’ current SES. This means that Gitanos discount the future 
heavily due to environmental uncontrollable factors which turn a preference for the 
present to be contextually appropriate, at least at the developmental time when this trait 
is established. Moreover, current SES loses nearly all its explanatory power once ethnicity 
is taken into account (although it is true that our current SES measures could not cover 
the whole spectrum of SES-related variables and there might be not enough variability, 
especially among Gitanos). This may ultimately imply that some fraction of the 
previously-reported relationship between socio-economic variables and DD (Harrison et 
al., 2002; Kirby et al., 2002; Read & Read, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2010) could be driven by 
unobserved factors related to the ecological conditions under which individuals 
developed, rather than by the individuals’ current SES. 
Recent research shows that individuals from small-scale societies with immediate-return 
systems display higher DD rates than individuals from agricultural societies in which 
resource accumulation is more pervasive (Salali & Migliano, 2015). The authors argue 
that in egalitarian immediate-return economic systems, discounting the future may be a 
group-level adaptive strategy to the extent that it prevents resource accumulation and, 
consequently, the formation of hierarchies which could threat within-group equality 
(Salali & Migliano, 2015; Woodburn, 1982). More research is required, however, to 
determine whether the existence of group-level selective pressures is a necessary 
prerequisite for the emergence of this kind of inter-group behavioral differences. 
In sum, further empirical research should systematically assess the extent to which inter-
individual differences in DD can be better characterized as inter-group differences. Ours 
is only a first step in this direction which must be complemented with data from a larger 
number of ethnic groups before being able to draw firmer conclusions. The study of only 
two ethnic groups which differ in a number of current and historical ecological factors 
(such as life expectancy, health and socio-economic status, discrimination and 
persecution rates) prevents a systematic dissection of the partial effects of each one of 
these group-level differences on DD. A recent study using survey data from more than 40 
countries finds that the proportion of “impatient citizens” (i.e. those who chose the 
sooner-smaller reward in a single hypothetical survey question) in a country is negatively 
related to the country’s average life expectancy, and that adding life expectancy to the 
equation eliminates the negative country-level relationship between impatience and age 
at first birth (Bulley & Pepper, 2017). The latter results, although not directly addressing 
causality due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, may suggest that it is environmental 
mortality cues (as proxied by life expectancy) that influence both short-run orientation 
and early-reproduction decisions. 
With the present data, causality cannot be assessed either and many questions remain 
unanswered. For instance, future research should try to elucidate which part of the inter-
ethnic differences in DD might be understood as reflecting group-level (culturally 
transmitted) adaptations rather than individual-level adaptations to group-level conditions 
(Cavalli-Sforza, & Feldman, 1981; McElreath et al, 2003). Life history traits are often 
acquired through cultural transmission (Brumbach et al, 2009). In our case, the historical 
common experience of discrimination and persecution of the Gitano population, which 
are nowadays much reduced as compared to past centuries, is an obvious candidate to 
represent a cultural influence on the Gitanos’ discounting behavior. Only the study of a 
larger number ethnic groups with varying group-level differences (in terms of both 
current and historical socio-ecological conditions), however, can effectively tackle this 
question. Yet, such an exercise would unavoidably lead to loss of experimental control 
since the inclusion of a larger number of ethnic groups, to the extent that they do not live 
in the exact same place, implies that many confounding factors are at play, such as 
geography, natural resource availability, weather, and political regime. 
Finally, our method to measure DD imposes several limitations that merit consideration. 
Although we focus on the differences between groups rather than on the exact estimated 
discount rates of participants, with the type of DD task we use, the elicited discount rates 
may be confounded by a series of factors. First, note that if Gitanos were less able than 
the majority to access and exploit the capital market (which seems reasonable), this might 
translate into higher estimated discount rates which are not related to pure time preference 
but to the (im)possibility of intertemporal arbitrage (Frederick et al, 2002). Although we 
consider that the relatively small monetary rewards offered in the task are not treated by 
subjects as susceptible for market arbitrage, and we also control for a number of income-
related variables, whether this factor can explain part of the difference between Gitanos 
and the majority is an interesting endeavor for future research. Second, another possible 
confound relates to the concavity of the utility function. Our method assumes that 
individuals’ utility functions are approximately linear over the range of stakes involved 
(this is common in the experimental literature on DD). However, a more concave utility 
function can be confounded with a higher discount rate (Andersen et al., 2008; Frederick 
et al, 2002; Lopez-Guzman et al., 2018). In this vein, our results could also be partially 
explained if Gitanos have a more concave utility function compared to the majority. Yet, 
this would mean that Gitanos are more risk averse since individual risk aversion is 
measured by the concavity of the utility function. Such an argument, while possible, is 
difficult to sustain given the evidence reviewed earlier (for instance, on incarceration 
rates). Third, the preference for sooner-smaller rewards over later-larger ones might be 
due to uncertainty about the future (Frederick et al, 2002). If any subject feels that the 
later reward will probably not be delivered then she can take the sooner reward in order 
to avoid the uncertainty. Therefore, she may appear as impatient while she is not. To 
alleviate this concern, we used a front-end delay methodology (Harrison et al., 2002) in 
which both the sooner and the later reward are delayed: the sooner reward is delayed by 
one month and the later by 7 months. Hence, if there is uncertainty/distrust about future 
payments then both choices will be equally dubious. Note that if the sooner payment 
immediate (instead of delayed) – as e.g. in Anokhin et al. (2011), Barkley et al. (2001), 
Dombrovski et al. (2011), Kirby et al. (2002)– then the respondent may choose it to 
reduce uncertainty instead of due to pure time preferences. Therefore our results might 
be explained by uncertainty only if Gitanos perceive the future (not the delayed payments 
in the task per se) as more uncertain than the majority. This is exactly what our paper 
argues: since the environment of Gitanos is harsher and the future is more uncertain for 
them, they are more focused on the short-run than the majority. Fourth, a higher 
expectation of future inflation may lead an individual to prefer sooner-smaller rewards 
without the influence of time preference, simply because the money is worth less in the 
future (Frederick et al, 2002). If this confound explains part of our results, it would mean 
that Gitanos expect higher inflation than non-Gitanos. In principle, we consider this to be 
counterintuitive since Gitanos should instead be assumed to care less about the possibility 
of inflation due to their poorer knowledge of economic dynamics – i.e. they should be 
more, not less, affected by “money illusion”. Even assuming that Gitanos expect higher 
inflation than non-Gitanos (due to any unobserved differential experience they might 
have), it is worth noting that the DD differences between the two groups are very 
remarkable. To explain the current results in absence of time preferences, Gitanos should 
expect a differential inflation >25% than the majority. However, the maximum inflation 
rate that Spain has experienced in the last 30 years was about 7%, with an average of 
about 3%. Thus, it sounds sensible to conclude that different expectations of inflation do 
not crucially drive our results. Fifth, if someone believes she will be richer in the future, 
she might associate a lower relative value to the future rewards – and thus look as more 
impatient - without any true effect of time preference (Frederick et al, 2002). Applied to 
our results, this would mean that Gitanos expect to be relatively richer in 7 months (vs. 1 
month) compared to non-Gitanos. In order to test the validity of this concern, we 
compared the DD of the two groups only for those individuals who have a regular monthly 
income source. People with regular income are expected to exhibit more homogeneous 
beliefs about their future wealth than those individuals with irregular income sources. 
Thus, if this confound is partially driving our results, we would expect that the DD 
differences between the two groups would be reduced for the subsample of subjects with 
regular income. However, among those with regular monthly income (n=58), the 
difference in estimated exponential discount rate between Gitanos and the majority is 
about 0.50 (p<0.01; controlling for demographic variables) while among those with more 
irregular incomes (n=93) the difference is about 0.30 (p<0.02). Therefore, we conclude 
that this result does not support the hypothesis of expectations of changing utility. In any 
case, please note that the gap between the two options is only 6 months, short enough to 
avoid large changes in expected wealth. 
In sum, our results suggest that discounting the future heavily might be a contextually 
appropriate response under the environmental conditions faced by Gitanos. A preference 
for the short-run could thus be developed as an adaptive response to uncertain and harsh 
ecologies, which talks against the view of impatience as dysfunctional (even if it may 
yield undesirable outcomes). Further research should systematically unpack the relative 
influences that each one of the specific environmental factors defining such ecologies 
have on discounting behavior. In particular, our data indicate that the formation of 
individuals’ time preferences might be importantly shaped by group-level social factors 
such as discrimination and segregation through their direct impact on environmental 
harshness and unpredictability. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of DD between the Gitano and the majority samples. Stochastic 
dominance analysis (panel A); mean Hyper-K and Exp-K for each age tercile (panels B 
and C); mean Hyper-K and Exp-K for below- and above-median total household income 
(panels D and E). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the Gitano and majority samples  
  Gitanos Majority 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hyper-K 64 0.912 0.397 0.020 1.211 87 0.640 0.419 0.020 1.211 
Exp-K 64 0.682 0.273 0.020 0.877 87 0.501 0.293 0.020 0.877 
Gender (male) 64 0.469 0.503 0 1 87 0.287 0.455 0 1 
Age 64 38.860 14.799 17 73 87 53.276 19.027 17 82 
Regular income 64 0.250 0.436 0 1 87 0.483 0.503 0 1 
Own income            
€0 64 0.297 0.460 0 1 87 0.322 0.469 0 1 
(€0, €500) 64 0.516 0.504 0 1 87 0.126 0.334 0 1 
[€500, €1000) 64 0.156 0.366 0 1 87 0.437 0.499 0 1 
[€1000, €2000) 64 0.031 0.175 0 1 87 0.080 0.274 0 1 
[€2000, €3000) 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.034 0.184 0 1 
Other household’s income          
€0 64 0.391 0.492 0 1 87 0.322 0.469 0 1 
(€0, €500) 64 0.453 0.502 0 1 87 0.092 0.291 0 1 
[€500, €1000) 64 0.109 0.315 0 1 87 0.276 0.450 0 1 
[€1000, €2000) 64 0.047 0.213 0 1 87 0.172 0.380 0 1 
[€2000, €3000) 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.103 0.306 0 1 
≥€3000 64 0 0 0 0 87 0.034 0.184 0 1 
Years schooling 64 2.906 3.022 0 6 87 6.632 4.232 0 15 
           
Notes: Note that the average educational level of our participants is rather low as compared to the country’s 
official statistics due to the facts that (i) the experiments were conducted in a semi-rural and low-income area, 
and (ii) that the participants were older than the average Spanish population (older adults are still nowadays less 
educated than younger ones in Spain, especially in rural and poor areas; see the strong negative correlation 
between age and years of schooling in Table 2).  
Table 2. Bivariate Zero-Order Correlations 
  DD 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
Gender 
(male) 
Age 
Regular 
income 
Own 
income 
Other h’s 
income 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
0.3172*** -      
0.0001 
 
  
     
Gender 
(male) 
0.0039 0.1863** -     
0.9625 0.0220  
      
Age -0.0868 -0.3838*** -0.0616 -    
0.2895 0.0000 0.4525  
     
Regular 
income 
-0.1118 -0.2365*** 0.2228*** 0.3314*** -   
0.1716 0.0035 0.0060 0.0000 
 
Own 
income 
-0.1602** -0.2161*** 0.2781*** 0.3222*** 0.6676*** -  
0.0494 0.0077 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 
 
Other 
household’
s income 
-0.1581* -0.3082*** -0.1727** -0.2532*** -0.1306 -0.1799** - 
0.0524 0.0001 0.0339 0.0017 0.1100 0.0271 
 
Years 
Schooling 
-0.1506* -0.4194*** 0.0540 -0.3831*** 0.0387 0.0282 0.3282*** 
0.0649 0.0000 0.5103 0.0000 0.6373 0.7309 0.0000  
Notes: Spearman’s rho coefficients and p-values. Ethnicity, Gender and Regular income are dummy variables taking the value 
of one if the participant is Gitano, male and has a regular income source, respectively; zero otherwise. Own income and Other 
household’s income are coded as ordered discrete variables. Since these are rank-order correlations, the measure of DD here is 
merely given by the number of sooner-smaller choices in the task, which is independent from the functional form used to 
characterize DD. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed.  
Table 3. Interval regression estimation of individuals’ DD (K) 
dep. var.: 
1a 
Hyper-K 
1b 
Exp-K 
2a 
Hyper-K 
2b 
Exp-K 
3a 
Hyper-K 
3b 
Exp-K 
4a 
Hyper-K 
4b 
Exp-K 
Ethnicity 
(Gitano) 
0.375*** 0.264*** 0.444*** 0.311*** 0.403*** 0.280*** 0.399** 0.277** 
(0.097) (0.069) (0.105) (0.075) (0.123) (0.087) (0.176) (0.125) 
Gender  
(male) 
  -0.091 -0.069 -0.037 -0.030 -0.041 -0.031 
  (0.104) (0.074) (0.106) (0.076) (0.122) (0.087) 
Age 
  -0.024 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 -0.015 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Age2 
  0.027 0.020 0.025 0.018 0.025 0.018 
  (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) 
Regular 
Income 
  
  0.034 0.023 0.023 0.016 
    (0.145) (0.104) (0.145) (0.104) 
o
w
n
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
   
 -0.070 -0.051 -0.083 -0.059 
 
   (0.140) (0.099) (0.146) (0.103) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
 
 
  
-0.156 -0.114 -0.158 -0.116 
 
   
(0.163) (0.116) (0.163) (0.116) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
 
 
  
-0.061 -0.038 -0.109 -0.073 
 
   (0.208) (0.147) (0.220) (0.155) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
 
 
  
-0.634** -0.467** -0.625* -0.456* 
 
   (0.287) (0.213) (0.324) (0.240) 
o
th
er
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
’s
 i
n
co
m
e 
(€0, 
€500) 
  
    0.024 0.012 
  
    (0.138) (0.098) 
[€500, 
€1000) 
  
    -0.045 -0.036 
  
    (0.143) (0.102) 
[€1000, 
€2000) 
  
    -0.109 -0.075 
  
    (0.154) (0.109) 
[€2000, 
€3000) 
  
    -0.176 -0.131 
  
    (0.225) (0.160) 
≥€3000 
  
    -0.103 -0.078 
  
    (0.226) (0.159) 
Years 
schooling 
  
    0.012 0.008 
  
    (0.018) (0.013) 
Constant 
0.648*** 0.510*** 1.079*** 0.833*** 1.089*** 0.840*** 1.059** 0.824*** 
(0.058) (0.041) (0.324) (0.229) (0.314) (0.222) (0.431) (0.304) 
ln sigma 
Cons. -0.607*** -0.945*** -0.618*** -0.956*** -0.632*** -0.971*** -0.638*** -0.978*** 
 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) 
chi2 14.910*** 14.516*** 19.180*** 18.757*** 28.613*** 27.437*** 34.569*** 34.463*** 
ll -395.167 -390.9827 -393.4772 -389.2568 -391.6776 -387.3093 -391.1013 -386.7487 
N 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 
Notes: Interval regression estimates. Model 1 tests the effect of ethnicity on DD without control variables. In model 2, 
demographic controls are included. Whether the individual has a regular income source and the individual’s own monthly 
income (omitted category: €0) are also controlled for in model 3. Finally, model 4 also controls for other household’s income 
(omitted category: €0) and years of schooling. For each model specification, Hyper-K and Exp-K are the dependent variable 
in column (a) and (b), respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, two-tailed. 
  
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
for 
“The appropriate response of Spanish Gitanos: Short-run orientation beyond 
current socio-economic status” 
 
 
S1. The delay discounting task  
For the experiment, we used an adaptation of the intertemporal choice task used 
by Harrison et al. (2002; see main text). We decided to use a front-end delay procedure 
to capture long-term discounting behavior and minimize the effect of distrust (in terms 
of whether the experimenters will effectively come back to the town to pay participants) 
on individuals’ choices. To do this, we employed a task consisting of 20 categories 
ranging from 2% to 100% simple annual interest rate (r). The procedure was as follows. 
Four assistants delivered the delay discounting decision sheet to the participants 
(each session consisted of 32 individuals, always with the same instructor [PBG] 
conducting the experiments). As can be seen in Figure S1, the decision sheet contained 
a table with two main columns (options A and B) and 20 rows. In each row, option A 
offered €150 to be received one month after the experiment, while option B offered a 
higher amount to be received seven months after the experiment. In an extra column, the 
participants could see the interest rate associated with the six-month wait (that is, with 
choosing option B), which increases across rows from 2% to 100%. Thus, option B in 
the first row offered €151.50 (i.e. r = 0.02) and option B in the twentieth row offered 
€225 (r = 1). The participants had to choose between option A and B in each of the 20 
rows by marking with a cross on the corresponding column.  
In order to avoid mistakes and, more specifically, inconsistent choices – a 
frequent problem with multiple-price-list tasks, where multiple switching patterns are 
often observed, even among university students –, the instructor conducted the task row 
by row. Subjects were asked, scenario by scenario, to choose between A and B. 
Moreover, they were advised that once option B was reached they should stay at that 
point, given that once B has been already chosen it makes no sense to switch to option 
A again in the next row. Given the (expected) low educational level of a non-negligible 
proportion of our participants (see Table 1 in the main text), we believe that this 
systematic procedure importantly reduced the number of mistakes. Since inconsistent 
choices impede the estimation of an individual’s discount rate, we thus reduced a 
potentially high number of missing observations to zero. 
The participants were told that because of financial constraints only one, 
randomly selected individual per session would be paid for this part of the experiment. 
Once the decision sheets were collected, the “winner” and the “prize” (row) were 
randomly selected by picking numbered balls from an opaque bag in front of the 
participants. The average earnings of the five selected participants were €166.50. One 
member of the team [AME] phoned each of them in order to arrange a meeting for 
payment after one or seven months depending on the option chosen by the participant in 
the randomly selected row. This was common knowledge among participants when 
making their decisions. Since both options in the task were delayed (front-end delay), 
our design avoids the problem of different transaction costs between options – including 
different levels of trust in getting actually paid. 
 
Figure S1. Screenshot of the delay discounting decision sheet (translated from Spanish) 
 
  
S2. Robustness checks for secondary analyses 
In this section, we complement the statistical analysis reported in the main text 
based on Spearman correlations (Table 2). In particular, we check the robustness of 
those analyses which include at least one binary variable to more appropriate statistical 
tests (i.e. either Mann-Whitney test or Fisher’s exact test in the case of two binary 
variables; two-tailed). 
According to Mann-Whitney test,  
• compared to a non-Gitano, the probability that a Gitano: chooses the sooner-
smaller reward more often in the DD task is 68.2% (p<0.001); is older is 27.6% 
(p<0.001); reports a higher personal income is 37.9% (p=0.008); reports a higher 
(other) household’s income is 32.6% (p<0.001); reports a higher number of 
years of schooling is 27.1% (p<0.001).  
• compared to a female, the probability that a male: chooses the sooner-smaller 
reward more often in the DD task is 50.2% (p=0.962); is older is 46.3% 
(p=0.451); reports a higher personal income is 65.9% (p<0.001); reports a higher 
(other) household’s income is 40.0% (p=0.034); reports a higher number of 
years of schooling is 53.0% (p=0.509). 
• compared to someone without regular income, the probability that a participant 
with regular income: chooses the sooner-smaller reward more often in the DD 
task is 43.5% (p=0.171); is older is 69.7% (p<0.001); reports a higher personal 
income is 87.9% (p<0.001); reports a higher (other) household’s income is 
42.5% (p=0.110); reports a higher number of years of schooling is 52.1% 
(p=0.636). 
 
According to Fisher’s exact test,  
• compared to non-Gitanos, Gitanos are 18.2% more likely to be male (46.9% vs. 
28.7%; p=0.027) and 23.3% less likely to report a regular income (25.0% vs. 
48.3%; p=0.004). 
• compared to females, males are 21.0% more likely to be Gitano (54.5% vs. 
35.4%; p=0.027) and 22.5% more likely to report a regular income (52.7% vs. 
30.2%; p=0.009). 
• compared to those without regular income, participants with regular income are 
24.0% less likely to be Gitano (27.6% vs. 51.6%; p=0.004) and 22.0% more 
likely to be male (50.0% vs. 28.0%; p=0.009) 
 
 
 
 
